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Abstract
This paper explores the study of bilateral oligopoly, in which both sellers and buyers
have substantial influence on the market. We lead readers coherently through the
key results that emerge from the literature on bilateral oligopoly by means of
worked examples based on the same underlying two commodity exchange econ-
omy, along with broader consideration of the relevant literature. This allows us to
concisely compare the different equilibrium outcomes when agents act simultane-
ously vs sequentially, and when some/all agents are assumed to behave competi-
tively, giving the reader much-needed straightforward access to the results of this
challenging literature.
Keywords Exchange economy  Bilateral oligopoly  Cournot-walras  Cournot-nash
JEL Classification C72  D43  D51
1 Introduction
‘‘It seems impossible to go on with analysing markets under the assumption of
perfect competition. Direct observation of economic activity reveals that
markets are the fields of ‘‘giants’’, operating simultaneously with a fringe of
small competitors. Even partial analysis has taken this picture of the market
when proposing oligopoly solutions to describe the outcomes of imperfectly
competitive markets. Behind the demand function there is a myriad of ‘‘small’’
price-taking agents, while the supply side is occupied by few agents appearing
as giants, contrasting with the dwarfs on the demand side.’’
Gabszewicz (2013)




The study of market power in imperfectly competitive markets has commanded
much attention from economists. The workhorse model of industrial organization
economists—that of Cournot competition—takes a partial equilibrium perspective
and makes the assumption that only firms have market power. Bilateral oligopoly is
a natural generalization of Cournot competition to consider markets in which both
sellers and buyers can have market power and so behave strategically in
manipulating prices to be more favourable to them. The purpose of this exposition
is to introduce the reader to the study of bilateral oligopoly by leading them through
non-trivial examples1 that illustrate some of the main ideas to emerge from the
literature. Furthermore, the examples provide a unified framework to compare
different kinds of oligopoly: symmetric oligopoly, where all agents are permitted to
act strategically; asymmetric oligopoly, where only some agents act strategically
with the rest assumed to behave as price takers; simultaneous oligopoly, where
sellers and buyers make their choices without knowledge of others’ decisions; and
sequential oligopoly, where some agents move first.
Bilateral oligopoly was first introduced by Gabszewicz and Michel (1997). The
model is that of an economy in which there are two commodities and agents have
‘‘corner endowments’’, i.e., they are endowed with only one of these two
commodities. In a noncooperative game, agents can then choose the amount of
their initial endowment to put up in exchange for the other commodity. It is often
convenient to think of the first of the two commodities as a consumption good and
the second as commodity money (which can be viewed as a numeraire), in which
case the agents endowed with the consumption good are called sellers, and those
endowed with the commodity money are buyers. Despite the simplicity of the
model, this structure is rich enough to study many interesting phenomena that may
arise in imperfectly competitive economies. A fruitful line of research focuses on
testing the robustness of the partial equilibrium analysis of Cournot oligopolies to
general equilibrium models without production where all agents, sellers and buyers,
have market power. For instance, Bloch and Ghosal (1997) and Bloch and Ferrer
(2001a) study agents’ incentives to create submarkets as the Cournot game suggests
that firms could gain market power by forming smaller submarkets. Dickson and
Hartley (2008) and Amir and Bloch (2009) focus on the existence of Nash
equilibrium and the comparative static properties of the equilibrium. Dickson
(2013a) pays particular attention to the effect of entry of additional sellers in
bilateral oligopoly, comparing the results to the conventional wisdom from the
Cournot model, and Dickson and Hartley (2013a) consider whether bilateral
oligopoly and Cournot competition are equivalent when there are many buyers.
The bilateral oligopoly model belongs to the line of research on strategic market
games initiated by the seminal papers of Shubik (1973), Shapley (1976), and
Shapley and Shubik (1977). There are many types of strategic market games (see
Giraud (2003) and Levando (2012) for a survey). Here we mention only the ‘‘trading
post model’’ and the ‘‘window model’’ which can be seen as different institutional
mechanisms through which prices are determined. In the first model, trade is
1 Dickson (2013b) shows that examples with Cobb-Douglas utility functions, very common in the
literature, have very peculiar features which do not hold in general.
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decentralised through a system of trading posts where commodities are exchanged.
Dubey and Shubik (1978) studied the trading post model where only commodity
money is used to buy other commodities while Amir et al. (1990) considered the
case in which any commodity can be used to buy other commodities.2 Differently,
Sahi and Yao (1989) studied the window model where trade is centralised by a
clearing house in which there is a ‘‘window’’ for each commodity. This model was
first proposed informally by Lloyd S. Shapley, and we call it the ‘‘Shapley window
model’’. It is important to stress that when there are only two commodities, as in
bilateral oligopoly, all three models coincide.
We start our analysis by recasting the classical Cournot game as an exchange
game where firms are replaced by sellers characterised by initial endowments and
utility functions, and buyers are represented by a demand function. Next, we
consider the Cournot-Walras equilibrium concept in exchange economies, intro-
duced by Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991) and Gabszewicz and Michel (1997).
This model describes, in a general equilibrium framework, the same kind of
imperfect competition as the Cournot game in which the buyers are assumed to be
price takers from whence a demand function can be derived. The exchange versions
of these cornerstone models to study imperfect competition allow us to compare
them with the bilateral oligopoly model in a clear way. In fact all examples in the
paper are based on the same exchange economy where sellers have quasi–linear
utility functions and buyers have quasi-linear quadratic utility functions that
generate a linear demand which does not exhibit wealth effects (so long as wealth is
large enough). By comparing the different approaches we find that there are two
main differences between the Cournot-Walras approach and the bilateral oligopoly
model.
First, bilateral oligopoly describes a symmetric oligopoly since all agents are
allowed to act strategically in manipulating prices by changing their actions,
whereas the Cournot-Walras approach describes an asymmetric oligopoly where
only the sellers are allowed to act strategically while the buyers are assumed to treat
prices as given and beyond their control.
Second, the Cournot-Walras approach has an intrinsic two-stage nature which
cannot be reconciled with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of simultaneous-move
bilateral oligopoly where all agents act simultaneously. In order to capture the two-
stage structure considered in Cournot-Walras, we define a sequential bilateral
oligopoly, where sellers move in the first stage and buyers move in the second stage,
and we adopt subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium as the equilibrium concept. As in
bilateral oligopoly, all agents are treated symmetrically in this model, in the sense
that no agents are assumed to be price takers.
The comparison between the Cournot-Walras approach and the bilateral
oligopoly model raises the question of whether models that impose the behavioural
assumption of price taking on some agents can be reconciled with fully strategic
models. This is the so-called problem of the ‘‘foundations of oligopoly’’ which seeks
to understand under which conditions price taking behaviour emerges
2 A strategic market game with trading post and fiat money was considered by Postlewaite and
Schmeidler (1978) and Peck et al. (1992).
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endogenously, and therefore whether the assumption of price taking is appropriate.
We deal with this question by replicating the economy to increase the number of
buyers while leaving the number of sellers fixed (which we do by following the
partial replica approach proposed by Dickson and Hartley (2013a) which replicates
the set of buyers while proportionally reducing their weight). As we do so, buyers
lose their ability to influence prices and so behave more and more like price takers.
We provide an example showing that, in the many-buyer limit, the equilibrium in a
sequential version of bilateral oligopoly in which the sellers move first and the
buyers move second coincides with the Cournot-Walras equilibrium (that has the
same sequential nature but assumes price taking) so sequential bilateral oligopoly
provides a foundation for the Cournot-Walras approach. In contrast, the equilibrium
in the simultaneous version of bilateral oligopoly remains distinct from the Cournot-
Walras equilibrium even in the many-buyer limit. As such, to provide a foundation
for the Cournot(-Walras) equilibrium concept a large number of buyers is necessary
but not sufficient: buyers must also move after sellers have irreversibly committed
to their decisions.
In the last part of our paper, we study the relationship between the Walras
(competitive) equilibrium and the other equilibrium concepts examined. To this end,
we show an example where, when all agents in the economy are replicated as in
Debreu and Scarf (1963), sellers’ and buyers’ commodity bundles at the limit of the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium in simultaneous bilateral oligopoly correspond to the
commodity bundles at the Walras equilibrium. This is not surprising because, as in
the partial replica, when agents are replicated they lose market power and in the
limit behave competitively. Since all agents are replicated, in the limit everyone
behaves competitively and then the outcome must be Walrasian. Therefore, the
bilateral oligopoly model can be used to study the foundations of perfect
competition as price taking behaviours can be obtained endogenously in equilibrium
when the number of all agents increases without bound.3
We conclude our analysis by making some welfare comparisons of the different
types of competition analysed. By the first welfare theorem, the Walras equilibrium
is Pareto efficient while the allocations obtained with the other equilibrium concepts
are Pareto inefficient. This can easily be seen because there exists an allocation that
Pareto dominates the one obtained at any equilibrium different from the Walras
equilibrium. In other words, when markets are imperfectly competitive the
equilibrium outcome is Pareto inefficient.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. In Sect. 2 we introduce the
Cournot exchange game. In Sect. 3 we describe the Cournot-Walras approach. In
Sect. 4 after having defined the simultaneous bilateral oligopoly model and the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, we give an example with a finite number of agents and
an example where we partially replicate the exchange economy concluding there
may be differences between a simultaneous bilateral oligopoly and the Cournot-
Walras approach even when the number of buyers is large. In Sect. 5 we introduce
the sequential bilateral oligopoly model, we partially replicate the exchange
3 See Gale (2000) for a discussion on why the study of the foundations of perfect competition is
important.
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economy, and we compare the limit of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium with
the Cournot-Walras equilibrium. In Sect. 6 we compare our previous results with
the Walras equilibrium and we make some welfare considerations. In Sect. 7 we
draw some conclusions and we outline some open problems.
2 Cournot game (partial equilibrium analysis)
‘‘Let us now imagine two proprietors and two springs of which the qualities
are identical, and which, on account of their similar positions, supply the same
market in competition.’’
A. A. Cournot (1838)
In this section, by taking a slightly different approach from the one proposed by
Cournot (1838), we consider the two proprietors as sellers of water and not as
producers. This means that they are characterised by an endowment of the good and
utility functions instead of cost functions.4 Note, however, that with a quasi-linear
utility specification as we use in our examples, the two approaches are very similar
as the disutility from not consuming the good when it is supplied to the market can
be interpreted as a cost of supply. The consumption good (water in Cournot’s
example) is denoted by x and it is exchanged for money which is denoted by y.5 A
commodity bundle (x, y) is a point in R2þ which is the set of all feasible commodity
bundles. As in Cournot (1838), we assume that buyers are represented by the
demand for the consumption good which is a downward sloping function of the
price, i.e., D ¼ f ðpxÞ. Each seller is characterized by a utility function, ui : R2þ ! R,
which represents their preferences, and by an initial endowment, ðx0i ; y0i Þ 2 R2þ, such
that x0i [ 0 and y
0
i ¼ 0, i.e., sellers hold only the consumption good. Sellers face the
demand and we assume that they choose a supply of the consumption good in order
to obtain a commodity bundle which maximises their utility. We suppose that there
are m sellers.
We now introduce the Cournot exchange game C. The strategy set of seller i is
Qi ¼ fqi 2 R : 0 qi  x0i g; ð1Þ
with qi the offer of the consumption good that seller i puts up in exchange for
money. Let Q ¼ Qmi¼1 Qi and Qh ¼
Q
i 6¼h Qi. Let q ¼ ðq1; . . .; qmÞ and qi ¼
ðq1; . . .; qi1; qiþ1; . . .; qmÞ be elements of Q and Qi respectively. We denote by
Q ¼
Pm
i¼1 qi the total amount of the consumption good offered for sale by sellers.
4 In contrast to the classical partial equilibrium analysis, we consider sellers as being endowed with the
good and deciding how much of that good to send to market in exchange for commodity money to
maximize their utility of consumption, rather than maximizing profit after defining a cost function. We do
so because in the rest of the paper we deal with two commodity exchange economies, a simple general
equilibrium framework in which the availability of the two goods is fixed and sellers are characterized by
their holdings of the good (rather than their production technologies) and we consider agents whose utility
depends positively on both commodities.
5 Commodity y should be called commodity money because it enters in the utility function. However, for
simplicity, we simply refer to it as money.
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Cournot’s model implicitly assumes there is an auctioneer who adjusts the price so
that the market clears, that is, total supply equals the amount demanded. As such,
for each q 2 Q, the price of the consumption good is pxðqÞ ¼ f1ðQÞ which implies
D ¼ Q and py is normalized to 1. For each q 2 Q, the commodity bundle
ðxiðqÞ; yiðqÞÞ of a seller i is given by
xiðqÞ ¼ x0i  qi;
yiðqÞ ¼ pxðqÞ  qi;
ð2Þ
for i ¼ 1; . . .;m. The payoff function of a seller i is
piðqÞ ¼ uiðxiðqÞ; yiðqÞÞ; ð3Þ
for i ¼ 1; . . .;m. A Cournot exchange game is then a set C ¼ fðQi; piðÞÞmi¼1g. We
now introduce the definition of a Cournot equilibrium.
Definition 1 The strategy profile q̂ is a Cournot equilibrium for the game C if for
each seller i ¼ 1; . . .;m we have piðq̂i; q̂iÞ piðqi; q̂iÞ, for each qi 2 Qi.
We now consider an example to illustrate the Cournot equilibrium concept.
Example 1 Consider a market with two sellers such that uiðx; yÞ ¼ lnð1þ xÞ þ y
and ðx0i ; y0i Þ ¼ ð3; 0Þ, for i ¼ 1; 2. Buyers are represented by the demand function
D ¼ 6 2px. Since we assume that the market for the consumption good clears,
D ¼ q1 þ q2, we obtain pxðqÞ ¼ 3 12 ðq1 þ q2Þ. To find the Cournot equilibrium
we need to find the strategies q̂1 and q̂2 which maximise the sellers’ payoffs.





This payoff function is strictly concave in q1, and an easy way to find the maximum
is to solve the problem as an unconstrained maximisation problem then check the









Since sellers are identical, we consider the symmetric Cournot equilibrium where












































; for i ¼ 1; 2:
h
While we consider a slight variation on the original Cournot model as we treat
firms as sellers with utility functions, the underlying principles are exactly the same.
Shubik (1973) raised the following critique to this type of oligopoly model:
‘‘The Cournot duopoly model is an open market model involving money.
After trade has taken place neither the amount of goods nor the amount of
money in the system is conserved. Goods flow out into the market and money
flows in from the market.’’
Shubik’s paper advocates a closed market model, where commodities flow within
the system and after trade the total amount of each commodity does not change. In
our example due to our treatment of the sellers the amount of the consumption good
is preserved, but it is immediate to see that the final amount of money is coming
from outside the model. This is a typical feature of partial equilibrium models where
each market is considered in isolation from the rest of the economy. Therefore, M.
Shubik is suggesting to study oligopoly within a general equilibrium model.
Furthermore, another critical feature of the Cournot exchange game is that agents
are modelled in different ways: sellers are represented by utility functions and initial
endowments while buyers are represented by a demand function.6
In the next section we address these two issues by introducing a two-commodity
exchange economy with corner initial endowments and by using the Cournot-
Walras equilibrium as solution concept.
3 Cournot-Walras approach
We start by defining the buyers who have been represented by a demand function in
the previous model. A buyer is characterised by a utility function ui : R
2
þ ! R
which represents their preferences and by an initial endowment, ðx0i ; y0i Þ 2 R2þ, such
that x0i ¼ 0 and y0i [ 0, i.e., buyers hold only money. We suppose that there are n
buyers in the exchange economy indexed i ¼ mþ 1; . . .;mþ n. The difference
between sellers and buyers in this model lies in the initial endowments: sellers hold
only the consumption good while buyers hold only money (the availability of which
is therefore fixed at their total endowment). We can now formally define an
exchange economy E ¼ fðuiðÞ; ðx0i ; y0i ÞÞ
mþn
i¼1 g which is the set containing all the
pairs ðuiðÞ; ðx0i ; y0i ÞÞ describing sellers and buyers. In two-commodity exchange
economies the price vector is simply p ¼ ðpx; pyÞ.
We now describe the agents’ behaviours in the Cournot-Walras approach. In the
Cournot game sellers were permitted to act strategically while buyers’ behaviour
was not modelled but represented by a demand function. The Cournot-Walras
6 Pantaleoni (1908) pointed out that Leon Walras was dissatisfied by the ‘‘approximative way’’ in which
the demand curve was introduced by Cournot in his analysis.
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approach derives the Walrasian (competitive) demands of the buyers from their
characteristics making the explicit assumption that they are price takers. The
Walrasian demands of a buyer i are the functions xiðpÞ and yiðpÞ that associate to
each positive price vector an amount of commodity x and y that maximises the
utility function uiðÞ in i’s budget set fðx; yÞ 2 R2þ : pxxþ pyy pyy0i g.7 In other





for any buyer i.We assume again that themarket of each commodity clears. Therefore,









i.e., buyers’ total demand of the consumption good must be equal to sellers’ total
supply of the consumption good. We denote by pðqÞ the price vector ðpxðqÞ; 1Þ that
solves equation (5).9 If equation (5) holds then the market for money also clears. By
having described the price formation rule, which is purely Walrasian, we can now
define the rules to calculate the commodity bundle of each agent. The buyers’
commodity bundles are given by the Walrasian demands calculated at the price
vector pðqÞ. Since sellers’ strategies are the same as in the Cournot exchange game,
their commodity bundles are given according to the equations in (2) at the price
vector pðqÞ. Consequently sellers’ payoff functions are defined as in (3). We finally
introduce the notion of an allocation ðxi; yiÞnþmi¼1 which is a specification of a com-
modity bundle for each seller and buyer.
We now have all the elements to define the Cournot-Walras equilibrium for the
exchange economy E.
Definition 2 A Cournot-Walras equilibrium for the exchange economy E is a
vector ~q and an allocation ð~xi; ~yiÞnþmi¼1 such that
– for each seller i ¼ 1; . . .;m we have
uiðxið~qi; ~qiÞ; yið~qi; ~qiÞÞ uiðxiðqi; ~qiÞ; yiðqi; ~qiÞÞ, for each qi 2 Qi;
– ð~xi; ~yiÞ ¼ ðxið~qÞ; yið~qÞÞ for the sellers i ¼ 1; . . .;m and ð~xi; ~yiÞ ¼
ðxiðpð~qÞÞ; yiðpð~qÞÞÞ for the buyers i ¼ mþ 1; . . .; n.
7 More generally, Walrasian demands can be correspondences which associate to each price the set of
commodity bundles which maximise the utility function in the budget set. For the sake of simplicity, we
just consider the case in which Walrasian demands are functions.
8 Note that this maximisation problem has a solution only for continuous utility functions and positive
prices.
9 To avoid cumbersome notation, but without confusion, we denote the same elements of different
models with the same symbol.
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Wenow consider an example to illustrate the Cournot-Walras equilibrium concept.
Example 2 Consider an exchange economy with 2 sellers and 2 buyers such that
uiðx; yÞ ¼ lnð1þ xÞ þ y and ðx0i ; y0i Þ ¼ ð3; 0Þ, for i ¼ 1; 2 (the sellers), and
uiðx; yÞ ¼ 3x 12 x2 þ y and ðx0i ; y0i Þ ¼ ð0; 5Þ, for i ¼ 3; 4 (the buyers).
10 To
calculate a Cournot-Walras equilibrium, the first step is to find buyers’ Walrasian









5p2y þ p2x  3pxpy
p2y
;
for i ¼ 3; 4. Study of the second-order conditions reveals the solution corresponds to
a maximum.11 Since we normalise py ¼ 1, the price of the consumption good which





By construction, this is the same inverse demand function as in Example 1, but
derived from buyers’ characteristics rather than assumed. Therefore, it is immediate
to see that each seller’s maximisation problem is equivalent to that in (4) from















; 1Þ. Finally, the allocation






























; for i ¼ 3; 4:
h
It is immediate to see that sellers’ commodity bundles and the total demand of the
consumption good from buyers correspond to the ones at the Cournot equilibrium.
Therefore, the Cournot-Walras equilibrium captures, in a general equilibrium
framework, the same kind of competition as the Cournot exchange game but where
the total quantities of the two commodities in the system are preserved, and buyers’
10 We use quadratic utility functions as the implied demand function from the buyers is then linear. Note
that each buyer’s utility function reaches a point of saturation at x ¼ 3; however, as the total endowment
of commodity x is 6 and we consider two symmetric buyers we will not be in danger of examining
solutions that breach this saturation point.
11 It is worth noting that, since the utility functions are quasi-linear, there can be corner solutions.
However, for the sake of simplicity and since this does not affect our analysis, we just consider interior
solutions.
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behaviour is explicitly modelled, assuming they are price takers. In other words, the
Cournot-Walras approach allows us to study asymmetric oligopoly in a general
equilibrium setting, with sellers acting strategically and buyers assumed to treat
prices as fixed. Therefore, oligopoly models based on exchange economies can
address Shubik (1973)’s critique.
The Cournot-Walras equilibrium concept was introduced by Gabszewicz and
Vial (1972) in a production economy and it was recast in exchange economies by
Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991) and subsequently by Gabszewicz and Michel
(1997). These contributions consider exchange economies characterised by few
oligopolists (sellers in our case) and many small agents (buyers in our case). In the
Cournotian spirit, the oligopolists are allowed to act strategically as they are few,
while small agents are assumed to act competitively as price takers as they are
many. However this kind of assumption was criticised by Okuno et al. (1980):
‘‘Traditional general equilibrium treatments of such situations [in which some
but not all agents have market power] have been deficient in that they have
simply assumed a priori that certain agents behave as price takers while others
act non-competitively, with no formal explanation being given as to why a
particular agent should behave one way or the other.’’
Our Example 2 supports this view as it shows that it is possible to use the
Cournot-Walras equilibrium in odd cases where buyers are assumed to behave
competitively even if there are only two of them. In other words, the Cournot-
Walras approach does not endogenously derive agents’ behaviours but it assumes a
priori that some agents can influence prices while others are price takers.12
The issue of asymmetrically imposing behavioural assumptions on some agents
is overcome in bilateral oligopoly models in which both sellers and buyers are
treated symmetrically in that all agents are allowed to behave strategically—no
price-taking assumptions are imposed a priori—and, departing from the Walrasian
tradition, the price is constructed from agents strategic decisions.
4 Simultaneous bilateral oligopoly
As stressed in the introduction, the bilateral oligopoly model is a strategic market
game based on a two-commodity exchange economy with corner initial endow-
ments.13 We define the exchange economy E ¼ fðuiðÞ; ðx0i ; y0i ÞÞ
mþn
i¼1 g as in the
12 A further shortcoming of the Cournot-Walras approach is that it is extremely challenging to obtain a
general existence result because oligopolists influence prices by manipulating the Walras price
correspondence which may fail to be continuous unless strict assumptions are imposed on the set of price-
taking agents. Nevertheless, some existence results have been obtained in particular frameworks:
Bonisseau and Florig (2003) proved the existence of a Cournot-Walras equilibrium in linear exchange
economies; Codognato and Julien (2013) proved the existence in mixed exchange economies where
agents on the continuum have Cobb-Douglas utility functions; and Shirai (2010) proves the existence of a
Cournot-Walras equilibrium in production economies.
13 Bloch and Ferrer (2001a) and Dickson and Hartley (2013b) also consider the case in which agents are
endowed with both commodities, i.e. have ‘‘interior’’ initial endowments, and can choose whether they
become sellers or buyers.
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previous section. The strategy set of a seller i is defined as in (1). The strategy set of
a buyer i is
Bi ¼ fbi 2 R : 0 bi  y0i g:
The strategy bi is the bid of money that buyer i makes on the consumption good. Let
B ¼ Qmþni¼1 Bi and Bh ¼
Q
i 6¼h Bi. Let b ¼ ðbmþ1; . . .; bmþnÞ and bi ¼
ðbmþ1; . . .; bi1; biþ1; . . .; bmþnÞ be elements of B and Bi respectively. For each
ðq; bÞ 2 Q  B, the price vector pðq; bÞ ¼ ðpxðq; bÞ; 1Þ is determined such that the
price of the consumption good is given by the ratio of the total money bids made for




if Q 6¼ 0







i¼mþ1 bi. Having defined the price formation rule, which is non-Wal-
rasian, we can now define the rules to calculate the commodity bundles of each
agent. For each ðq; bÞ 2 Q  B, the commodity bundle ðxiðq; bÞ; yiðq; bÞÞ of a seller
i is given by
xiðq; bÞ ¼ x0i  qi;
yiðq; bÞ ¼ pxðq; bÞ  qi;





if pxðq; bÞ 6¼ 0





yiðq; bÞ ¼ y0i  bi;
for i ¼ mþ 1; . . .;mþ n. As such, each agent’s amount of the commodity they are
endowed with reduces by the quantity of that commodity they offer to the market,
and the amount of the other commodity is given by their proportional share of the
aggregate amount of that commodity offered by the other side of the market, so
sellers receive a share qi=Q of the aggregate bid B, and buyers receive a share bi=B
of the aggregate offer Q. The payoff function of agent i is
piðq; bÞ ¼ uiðxiðq; bÞ; yiðq; bÞÞ, for i ¼ 1; . . .;mþ n. The simultaneous bilateral
oligopoly game is then a set C0 ¼ fðQi; piðÞÞmi¼1; ðBi; piðÞÞ
mþn
i¼mþ1g.
The definition of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly is as follows.
Definition 3 The strategy profile ðq̂; b̂Þ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game
C
0 if for each seller i ¼ 1; . . .;m we have piðq̂i; q̂i; b̂Þ piðqi; q̂i; b̂Þ, for each
qi 2 Qi, and for each buyer i ¼ mþ 1; . . .;mþ n we have
piðq̂; b̂i; b̂iÞ piðq̂; bi; b̂iÞ, for each bi 2 Bi.
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We now consider an example to illustrate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium concept.
Example 3 Consider the exchange economy defined in Example 2. To find the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, we have to solve the payoff maximisation problems for
all agents. We first consider sellers and then buyers. Consider the maximisation




This payoff function is strictly concave in q1; we solve as an unconstrained problem












Since all sellers are identical and all buyers are identical, we consider a symmetric































 1 ¼ 0:
Since we consider the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium, we then obtain
b̂ ¼ q̂ 1
2
ð3 q̂Þ: ð8Þ
Study of the second-order conditions reveals the solution corresponds to a maxi-
mum. By combining equations (7) and (8), we find that the Cournot-Nash equi-
librium for the bilateral oligopoly model is
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; 1Þ and the
allocation is













; for i ¼ 1; 2;











; for i ¼ 3; 4:
h
This example clarifies that the simultaneous bilateral oligopoly model allows us to
study oligopoly where all agents are treated symmetrically and no assumptions on
their behaviours are made a priori. Indeed, given the structure of the game, all agents
act strategically because they can manipulate the price by changing their actions.
Therefore, bilateral oligopoly addresses the critique raised by Okuno et al. (1980).
The fact that buyers act strategically is one of the reasons why sellers’ and buyers’
commodity bundles at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium are different from those
obtained at the Cournot-Walras equilibrium, even if the exchange economies in
Examples 2 and 3 are the same. We stress again that buyers are assumed to behave as
price-takers in the Cournot-Walras approach while they are permitted to act
strategically in bilateral oligopoly. Furthermore, while the Cournot-Walras model
suffers from issues because of the potential discontinuity of the Walras price
correspondence, this is not the case in bilateral oligopoly because the price formation
rule is non-Walrasian. The existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium was studied by
Bloch and Ferrer (2001a) and Dickson and Hartley (2008), who also studied
uniqueness of equilibrium. Additionally, Bloch and Ferrer (2001b) showed the
existence when all agents have a constant elasticity of substitution utility function.
At this point of the analysis a natural question arises: is it possible to employ the
bilateral oligopoly model to study asymmetric oligopoly where no a priori
assumptions on agents behaviours are made? In other words, is it possible to
develop a framework where the differences in agents’ behaviours arise endoge-
nously in equilibrium? This is also known as the problem of providing a strategic
foundation for oligopoly.
In the literature, two main approaches are used to this end. The first approach
consists of using mixed exchange economies where large agents (oligopolists) are
represented by atoms and small agents (competitive agents) by an atomless
continuum. An atom is an agent whose initial endowment is non-negligible compared
to the total endowment of the economy while an agent in the continuum holds only a
negligible part of it. The model was proposed by Gabszewicz andMertens (1971) and
Shitovitz (1973) in cooperative game theory. Shitovitz (1973) stated:
‘‘The main point in our treatment is that the small and the large traders are not
segregated into different groups a priori; they are treated on exactly the same
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basis. The distinctions we have found between them are an outcome of the
analysis; they have not been artificially introduced in the beginning, as is the
case in the classical approach.’’
This approach based on mixed exchange economies was also extended to
noncooperative game theory by Okuno et al. (1980), in order to address their
critique, and further generalised by Busetto et al. (2011) and Busetto et al. (2018).
Busetto et al. (2020) undertake a study of bilateral oligopoly in a mixed exchange
economy. In this setting, while all agents have a priori the same strategic position,
they found that in equilibrium large agents represented by atoms have market power
while small agents on the continuum behave as if they are price-takers.
The second approach is based on considering partial replicas of exchange
economies where the number of some agents is increased while proportionally
reducing their weights. This method was introduced to bilateral oligopoly by
Dickson and Hartley (2013a) and it was subsequently formalized, using the tools of
measure theory, by Busetto et al. (2017). The main result of this approach is that
agents who are replicated gradually lose their ability to influence prices as their
number increases and in the limit they behave as price takers, whereas agents that
are not replicated and remain large retain their market power.
In the last part of this section,we consider the second approach and study the limit of
partial replicas where we replicate only the set of buyers. We study such a limit
because it represents an asymmetric oligopoly where buyers are asymptotically
negligible and so should behave as price takers. Consider an exchange economy
E ¼ fðuiðÞ; ðx0i ; y0i ÞÞ
mþn
i¼1 gwhere the firstm agents are sellers and all other n agents are
buyers. The partially replicated exchange economy Er consists in an exchange
economy having the same sellers as E and r replicas of each buyer in E. Furthermore, to
each buyer is associated a weight 1
r
which is used to weight buyers when aggregating
across them. It is then clear that the aggregate bid must include the weighting factor 1
r







bij the weighed sum of bids where bij is the bid of the jth replica of
buyer i. This kind of partial replica based on reducing the weight of each buyer as the
number of replicas increases allows us to increase the number of buyers, consequently
reducing their market power, without the undesirable consequence of the demand for
the consumption good exploding while its supply remains fixed (as the number of
sellers is fixed) and the price consequently tending to infinity.14
14 The weighting is used whenever aggregating across the set of buyers—to construct the aggregate bid
as we explained, and also in the aggregation of buyers’ endowments and demands when considering
market clearing, which therefore takes place at a per-replica level. In the replicated exchange economy Er








































These equations further clarify the role of the weight in avoiding that the demand for the consumption
good and the endowment of commodity 2 explode. Furthermore, they also show that there is clear
analogy between the weight 1
r
and the measure of an atom in mixed exchange economies. The interested
reader should refer to Busetto et al. (2017) and their definition of partial replica à la Cournot.
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Note that given the price formation rule (6) and the definition of ~B, if r increases,
then the buyers’ ability to influence prices decreases and at the limit, for r ! 1,
totally disappears. Obviously we have that E ¼ E1. It is important to stress that the
limit of a sequence of Cournot-Nash equilibria, which is denoted by ðq; bÞ, is not a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the limit economy as the underlying game in the limit
is not well-defined. Nevertheless, the limit of the sequence gives us an object that
can be compared to the other solution concepts in finite economies.
We now consider an example to illustrate how to partially replicate an exchange
economy and how to calculate its limit.
Example 4 Consider the partial replica of the exchange economy defined in
Example 2 with r replicas of each buyer. We then have an exchange economy with 2
sellers and 2r buyers, i.e., uiðx; yÞ ¼ lnð1þ xÞ þ y and ðx0i ; y0i Þ ¼ ð3; 0Þ, for i ¼ 1; 2
and uijðx; yÞ ¼ 3x 12 x2 þ y and ðx0ij; y0ijÞ ¼ ð0; 5Þ, for i ¼ 3; 4 and j ¼ 1; . . .; r. As
each buyer has a weight 1
r





b4j. To simplify the
analysis, we consider a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium, where all buyers play
the same strategy, and then ~̂B ¼ 2b̂. But then, if we consider the sellers’ payoff
maximisation problems, it is straightforward to verify that in a symmetric




On the contrary, buyers’ maximisation problems are different from the previous
example because now there are 2r buyers instead of two. Consider the maximisation






















 1 ¼ 0: ð11Þ
Since we consider a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium where q̂1 ¼ q̂2 ¼ q̂ and







Let k ¼ 1 1
2r
. By combining equations (9) and (12), we obtain the following
Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the bilateral oligopoly model
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 2k  2

:
The limit of this Cournot-Nash equilibrium as r ! 1 is qi ¼ 2 for sellers and
bij ¼ 2 for buyers. At the limit the price vector is pðq; bÞ ¼ ð1; 1Þ and the sellers’
and buyers’ commodity bundles are
ðxiðq; bÞ; yiðq; bÞÞ ¼ ð1; 2Þ; for a seller i;
ðxijðq; bÞ; yijðq; bÞÞ ¼ ð2; 3Þ; for a buyer ij:
We finally remark that the allocation
ðx1; y1Þ; ðx2; y2Þ; ðx31; y31Þ; . . .; ðx3r; y3rÞ; ðx41; y41Þ; . . .; ðx4r; y4rÞð Þ ¼
ð1; 2Þ; ð1; 2Þ; ð2; 3Þ; . . .; ð2; 3Þ; ð2; 3Þ; . . .; ð2; 3Þð Þ
for the partially replicated exchange economy Er is feasible for any r as the market
clearing conditions are satisfied, i.e.,











¼ 1þ 1þ r 1
r
2þ 2ð Þ ¼ 3þ 3¼ x01 þ x02











¼ 2þ 2þ r 1
r
3þ 3ð Þ ¼ r 1
r












It is immediate to see that the commodity bundles at the limit of the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium are different from the ones at the Cournot-Walras equilibrium of
Example 2. This result is somewhat surprising as at the limit of the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium buyers have no influence on the price, as is assumed in the Cournot-
Walras approach, yet the equilibrium allocations differ. This is due to the fact that
the Cournot-Walras approach has an intrinsic two-stage structure—sellers decide
their supply taking into account their influence on the Walrasian demands of
buyers—whereas when considering a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the bilateral
oligopoly model all agents choose their actions simultaneously so sellers must form
beliefs about how the buyers will behave. This fact was stressed by Dickson and
Hartley (2013a) who considered the conditions under which the two models
coincide in the limit, and when they do not. In mixed exchange economies,
Codognato (1995) and Busetto et al. (2008) showed that the allocation at a Cournot-
Walras equilibrium is different from the one at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the
Shapley window model. Therefore, we can conclude that the bilateral oligopoly
model can be useful to study simultaneous asymmetric oligopoly in a closed market
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model by partially replicating the underlying exchange economy but it does not
provide a foundation of the Cournot-Walras approach. In the next section, we
address this last issue by studying a sequential bilateral oligopoly model.
5 Sequential bilateral oligopoly
In this section we consider a sequential-move bilateral oligopoly model with a two-
stage structure where the timing of the model is exogenously specified as follows: in
the first stage sellers simultaneously choose the quantities of the consumption good
to put up in exchange for money; in the second stage, after observing all sellers’
offers, the buyers simultaneously choose the quantity of money to bid for the
consumption good. At the end of the second stage bids and offers are aggregated
and the price is determined according to the usual rule in (6). Groh (1999) first
considered a sequential reformulation of bilateral oligopoly in the context of an
example, that was extended to general settings in Dickson (2006).15
We first consider an exchange economy E ¼ fðuiðÞ; ðx0i ; y0i ÞÞ
mþn
i¼1 g and we then
define the sequential bilateral oligopoly. The strategy set of a seller i is defined as in
(1). The strategy set of a buyer i is
Bi ¼ fbiðÞ, a function such that bi : Q ! ½0; y0i g:
Let B ¼ Qmþni¼mþ1 Bi and bðÞ ¼ ðbmþ1ðÞ; . . .; bmþnðÞÞ be an element of B. For each




if Q 6¼ 0







i¼mþ1 biðqÞ. For each ðq; bðqÞÞ 2 Q  B, the commodity bundle
ðxiðq; bðqÞÞ; yiðq; bðqÞÞÞ of a seller i is given by
xiðq; bðqÞÞ ¼ x0i  qi;
yiðq; bðqÞÞ ¼ pxðq; bðqÞÞ  qi;





if pxðq; bðqÞÞ 6¼ 0





yiðq; bðqÞÞ ¼ y0i  biðqÞ;
for i ¼ mþ 1; . . .;mþ n. The payoff function of an agent i is piðq; bðqÞÞ ¼
15 Dickson and Hartley (2013a) consider a sequential market share game and Busetto et al. (2008)
consider a sequential reformulation of the Shapley window model.
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uiðxiðq; bðqÞÞ; yiðq; bðqÞÞÞ, for i ¼ 1; . . .;mþ n. The sequential bilateral oligopoly
model is then a set C00 ¼ fðQi; piðÞÞmi¼1; ðBi; piðÞÞ
mþn
i¼mþ1g.
We now define a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (hereafter SPNE) which is
the equilibrium concept we use in this dynamic game.
Definition 4 A strategy profile ðq̂; b̂ðq̂ÞÞ is a SPNE for C00 if and only if it is a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the game C00.
Note that in the sequential bilateral oligopoly the subgames are the whole game
and the subgames in which buyers choose their optimal bids following any vector of
offers from the sellers. We now consider an example to illustrate how to find the
SPNE and how to find the limit of a sequence of SPNE when we partially replicate
the exchange economy. We stress again that the limit is not a SPNE as the
underlying game is not well-defined at the limit.
Example 5 Consider the same partially replicated exchange economy defined in
Example 4. As before, to simplify the analysis, we consider a symmetric SPNE that
can be computed as follows. We first find a symmetric Nash equilibrium among the
buyers for any feasible strategies of the sellers (i.e., in any buyers’ subgame). We
then substitute the equilibrium strategies of the buyers in the sellers’ payoff
functions to determine their reaction functions given the responses of the buyers,
after which we can find mutually consistent best responses among the sellers. The
strategy profile obtained by this method is a SPNE. It is immediate to verify that
each buyer’s maximisation problem is as in (10). Therefore the best response of the














 1 ¼ 0:
Since we consider a symmetric SPNE where b̂3jðqÞ ¼ b̂4jðqÞ ¼ b̂ðqÞ for j ¼ 1; . . .; r,
from the previous equation we obtain








with k ¼ 1 1
2r
. Consider next the maximisation problem of seller 1. If we sub-









þ 6k  2kq1  kq2
2
¼ 0:
Since we consider a symmetric SPNE where q̂1 ¼ q̂2 ¼ q̂, the previous equation
implies
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Therefore, by combining equations (14) and (15), we obtain the following SPNE for
the sequential bilateral oligopoly


















 3k  2
3












 3k  2
3


























; 1Þ and the sellers’ and
buyers’ commodity bundles are














; for a seller i;














; for a buyer ij:
h
It is immediate to see that the commodity bundles at the limit of the SPNE are
different to those at the limit of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which moves are
simultaneous, but are the same as those at the Cournot-Walras equilibrium. We
stress again that in this framework all agents are treated symmetrically and the
different behaviours of sellers and buyers are obtained endogenously at the limit of
the SPNE. With this last example, we have shown that sequential bilateral oligopoly
in which it is exogenously specified that sellers move first and buyers move second
can provide a closed market model to study asymmetric oligopoly in which the
buyers are assumed to behave as price takers by partially replicating the underlying
exchange economy. Furthermore, this model can provide a foundation for the
Cournot-Walras approach. It is worth stressing that the price equation (13) in the
many buyer limit corresponds to the inverse demand function in Example 1. In
mixed exchange economies, Busetto et al. (2008) showed that the set of the
Cournot-Walras equilibrium allocations coincides with a particular subset of SPNE
allocations of the two-stage reformulation of the Shapley window model.
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6 Walras equilibrium and welfare
The Walrasian analysis in the synthesis reached in the contributions of Debreu
(1959), Arrow and Hahn (1971) and McKenzie (2002) crucially relies on the
assumption of price-taking, i.e., all agents are assumed to behave competitively. It is
then important to study under which conditions on the fundamentals of an economy
agents consider prices as given endogenously in equilibrium, without making ad hoc
assumptions. This is the problem of providing a strategic foundation for perfect
competition, which is similar in spirit to the problem of finding a foundation for
models of oligopoly. In fact, a strategic foundation for perfect competition can also
be provided by considering continuum exchange economies or replicated exchange
economies.16 In cooperative game theory Aumann (1964) provided a foundation for
perfect competition in economies with a continuum of agents by showing an
equivalence result between the core and the Walras allocation. Subsequently, in
noncooperative game theory, Dubey and Shapley (1994) and Codognato and Ghosal
(2000) considered strategic market games with a continuum of agents and they show
equivalence results between the Cournot-Nash and Walras allocations. Those results
are based on the fact that when there is a continuum of agents everyone is negligible
and cannot influence prices. The second approach based on replicated exchange
economies was pioneered in cooperative game theory by Edgeworth (1881) and
further analysed by Debreu and Scarf (1963).17 Subsequently, Dubey and Shubik
(1978), Sahi and Yao (1989), and Amir et al. (1990) applied this technique to
strategic market games. They show that when all agents in the economy are
replicated the allocation at the limit of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium corresponds to
the allocation at the Walras equilibrium. Those results are heuristically based on the
fact that when the number of agents increases their influence on prices decreases and
in the limit totally disappears.18
We now show how the bilateral oligopoly model can be employed to provide a
foundation for perfect competition by considering replicated exchange economies.
Consider the exchange economy E ¼ fðuiðÞ; ðx0i ; y0i ÞÞ
mþn
i¼1 g. A replicated exchange
economy consists in an exchange economy where all agents of E are replicated
r times. We now define the Walras equilibrium concept.
Definition 5 A Walras equilibrium is a pair ðp; ðxi ; yi Þ
nþm
i¼1 Þ of a price vector and
an allocation such that each commodity bundle ðxi ; yi Þ maximises agent i’s utility

















From the results in the previous literature, we can conjecture that in replicated
exchange economies all agents lose market power and at the limit for r ! 1 they
16 These different approaches are illustrated by the distinction between limit theorems and theorems in
the limit (see Gale (2000)). See Mas-Colell (1982) for a study on the links between the two approaches.
17 Note that this replica differs from the partial replica defined in Sect. 4 in two respects: all agents in the
economy are replicated and it does not require to associate a weight to each agent.
18 Mas-Colell (1980) surveyed the main contributions on the foundations of perfect competition by
considering other noncooperative approaches that do not rely on strategic market games.
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all behave competitively. We now consider an example to illustrate this point by
showing that the sellers’ and buyers’ commodity bundles at the limit of the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium correspond to the ones at the Walras equilibrium.
Example 6 Consider the replica of the exchange economy defined in Example 2.
We then have an exchange economy with 2r sellers and 2r buyers, i.e., uijðx; yÞ ¼
lnð1þ xÞ þ y and ðx0ij; y0ijÞ ¼ ð3; 0Þ, for i ¼ 1; 2 and j ¼ 1; . . .; r and uijðx; yÞ ¼
3x 1
2
x2 þ y and ðx0ij; y0ijÞ ¼ ð0; 5Þ, for i ¼ 3; 4 and j ¼ 1; . . .; r. The Walras
equilibrium of the replicated exchange economy is19



































; for i ¼ 3; 4 and j ¼ 1; . . .; r:
By following the same steps as in Example 3, we obtain a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium
ðq̂11; . . .; q̂1r; q̂21; . . .; q̂2r; b̂31; . . .; b̂3r; b̂41; . . .; b̂4rÞ












3; 4 and j ¼ 1; . . .; r with k ¼ 1 1
2r
. The limit of this Cournot-Nash equilibrium as









 3 for buyers. At the limit the price






; 1Þ and the sellers’ and buyers’ commodity bundles are













; for a seller ij;











; for a buyer ij:
h
It is immediate to see that the commodity bundles at the limit of the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium correspond to the ones at the Walras equilibrium of the underlying
exchange economy. This example further clarifies that the assumption of
competitive behaviour is justified when there are many of each type of agent.
It is worth noting that this convergence to the Walras equilibrium in terms of
commodity bundles, when all agents are replicated, is also obtained with the
Cournot-Walras equilibrium and the SPNE. These results, obtained for particular
examples, suggest that the timing of the model is not relevant when considering a
foundation for perfect competition. Lahmandi-Ayed (2001) proved the converge of
a Cournot-Walras equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium in exchange economies. As
19 It is straightforward to verify that sellers’ and buyers’ commodity bundles are the same for any r.
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mentioned above, Dubey and Shubik (1978), Amir et al. (1990), and Sahi and Yao
(1989) studied the converge of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium to the Walras
equilibrium in strategic market games. Koutsougeras and Meo (2018) considered
the convergence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium for
general sequences of economies whose distribution of characteristics has compact
support by using the model developed by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1978) and
Peck et al. (1992).
We conclude this section by making some welfare considerations on the
equilibrium concepts used throughout the paper. First of all, by the first welfare
theorem, the Walras equilibrium is Pareto efficient. In contrast, all other allocations
found in Examples 2–5 are Pareto inefficient: it is possible to find other commodity
bundles which Pareto dominate them. In the following table we report the utility
levels of sellers and buyers in the different examples.
Commodity Bundles Utility














































p  2.064 7.158















































p  1.953 7.837
It is interesting to note that at the Walras equilibrium, the only efficient
equilibrium, sellers get the lowest utility while buyers get the highest. Furthermore,
sellers get the highest utility at the Cournot-Walras equilibrium (which is the same
as the limit of the SPNE in sequential bilateral oligopoly) which means that, in our
examples, they are better off when they face competitive buyers in a sequential
oligopoly. We finally remark that Examples 2–6 belong to the general equilibrium
framework while Example 1 is a model of partial analysis. For this reason the
efficiency of that model cannot be evaluated by using the notion of Pareto
efficiency.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided a unified framework to compare different
equilibrium concepts to study imperfect competition in exchange economies. We
have also clarified the differences among symmetric, asymmetric, simultaneous, and
sequential oligopoly and analysed the relationships among them in terms of
replicated exchange economies and equilibrium concepts.
123
A. Dickson, S. Tonin
By studying our examples we have found some interesting facts. We have seen
that bilateral oligopoly can be used to provide a strategic foundation for asymmetric
oligopoly models that impose price taking assumptions on some agents, but that this
requires a particular timing structure in that those agents that are assumed to be
price takers, and are replicated, must move last. Bilateral oligopoly can also be used
to provide a strategic foundation for models that assume price taking for all agents,
where in contrast timing does not matter. The study of a general strategic foundation
for asymmetric oligopoly models will continue to be an interesting area for future
research.
It is important to remark that asymmetric oligopoly can be studied by using the
partial replica or by considering mixed exchange economies. This alternative
approach was introduced by Okuno et al. (1980) and further scrutinised by Busetto
et al. (2008, 2011, 2017) and Busetto et al. (2018, 2020).
Our main focus has been on exchange economies because economies with
production raise many theoretical and technical problems (see Hart (1985), Gary-
Bobo (1988), Bonanno (1990) for a survey). To the best of our knowledge, the only
contributions on strategic market games with production are Dubey and Shubik
(1977) and Chen et al. (2017). A simpler approach was proposed by Gabszewicz
and Michel (1997) (see also Dickson and Hartley (2013a)) which considers bilateral
oligopoly where only some agents (the sellers) are endowed with a production
technology. We leave for further research the study of the different kinds of
imperfect competition considered here in economies with production. It is worth
highlighting that in a framework with production it is possible to study the
differences between sellers maximizing profits and seller maximizing utility
functions. This is a classical issue in general equilibrium with imperfect
competition. Furthermore, we have restricted our analysis to exchange economies
with only two commodities because in a framework with more commodities the
results depend on the particular type of strategic market game adopted.
We have discussed related contributions studying the core of exchange
economies. This approach, belonging to cooperative game theory, differs from
strategic market games which are non-cooperative games. Koutsougeras and Ziros
(2008) and Ziros (2011) worked on blending the cooperative approach with strategic
market games in atomless continuum economies by considering the core and the
Mas-Colell bargaining set respectively. We think that this line of research is very
important to shed some light on these two different approaches that can be used to
study imperfect competition in bilateral oligopolies but also in more general
exchange economies. Indeed, Ziros (2011) remarked that further interesting insights
may be obtained with his approach by considering economies with a finite number
of agents.
We conclude by mentioning that there is a small literature on experiments in
bilateral oligopoly whose contributions are Duffy et al. (2011) and Barreda-
Tarrazona et al. (2018). We expect this line of inquiry to become more popular in
the coming years.
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